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INNOVATION AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY

Transforming Maine’s Economy:
Innovation and Entrepreneurship Policy
by Catherine Searle Renault
Innovation and entrepreneurship are major drivers of economic growth. Catherine Renault suggests that support
for them is a primary role of state government in order to increase the well-being of citizens through the provision
of well-paying jobs that cannot be easily exported. Today, the state’s role is described as “enhancing the innovation
ecosystem,” with the goal of increased productivity, innovation, and competitiveness. Renault outlines policies
that can build this ecosystem, each of which is part of an overall policy environment that will support innovation
and entrepreneurship.

INNOVATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

I

n 1987, Robert M. Solow was awarded the Nobel
Prize in Economics for his work on the theory of
economic growth. Using computers newly available for
economic research in the 1950s, Solow looked at the
growth of various economies in the world, expecting to
confirm the Keynesian theory that growth was related
to the labor and capital in a given country. Much to
his surprise, labor and capital explained only a small
portion of the observed growth. Researchers (Romer
1986, 1990) eventually concluded, and subsequent
research has confirmed, that as much as 80 percent of
economic growth is due to new knowledge, specifically
new knowledge that has been brought to the market—
innovation.
We each have our own experiences of this phenomenon. Think about the impact of Google on our
everyday lives and our country’s economy. Fifteen years
ago, Google was just an idea in the mind of two graduate students, Sergey Brins and Larry Page. Today, it is a
$50 million revenue company with over 42,000
employees. Its products are so ubiquitous that we regularly use their company name as a verb, as in, “Did you
Google that?”
The Internet is another illustration of the impact of
innovation on economic growth. The Boston Consulting
Group calculates the Internet contributes more than 4.7
percent of our nation’s economy, more than the federal
government (Dean et al. 2012). Twenty-five years ago,

the technology that became the Internet was the backbone of ARPANET, a Department of Defense network
for the sharing of research findings. It wasn’t until it was
turned loose as a commercial network in the mid-1990s
that the Internet exploded into the phenomenon that
we have today.
This pattern has been repeated many times and not
just with technologies, although the application of new
scientific and technical knowledge has enabled many
improvements in productivity that have accelerated
growth. Remember when it took days to send packages
to each other, and important documents were mailed or
faxed? FedEx exploited the opportunity by marrying
advanced logistics with a consumer focus and promising
prompt delivery “when it absolutely, positively has to be
there overnight.” A business model innovation as much
as a technical innovation, FedEx changed the way we do
business.
Innovations in medicine, in energy, in the consumer
space, all drive our economy. And to a large extent, these
innovations come out of entrepreneurial companies. It is
estimated that firms that went public in the 1980s and
1990s accounted for 40 percent of employment in
publicly traded companies in 2000 (Davis et al. 2007;
Davis and Kahn 2008).
INDUSTRIAL POLICY

W

hile it may seem obvious that supporting innovation and entrepreneurship is essential to driving
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economic growth, many in the United States have
derided policies to do just that as industrial policy.
Often framed as “picking winners and losers,” industrial
policy is considered as unwarranted involvement by
government in a free market. Since the free market is
perfect, this theory goes, government should not get
involved.
There are three problems with this argument. First,
most governments around the world are managing their
innovation economies to a far greater level than would
ever be contemplated here. In China, entire cities have
been built around new universities and industrial
complexes. The European Union is explicitly supporting
“industrial policy that will put the EU economy on a
dynamic growth path strengthening EU competitiveness, providing growth and jobs, and enabling the transition to a low-carbon and resource-efficient economy”
(European Commission 2010: 4).
The second problem with the free-market, antiindustrial policy position is that there are numerous
instances where the free market is not in fact fully efficient. There are substantial information asymmetries,
meaning that not all entrepreneurs or innovators have
the same information. And most importantly, innovation, and the basic research that underlies it, is a public
good, shared by all citizens. Left to themselves, single
firms and individuals will underinvest in research and
development (R&D). Free markets will not produce the
correct amount of innovation and growth.
The third problem with the industrial policy red
herring is that the U.S. government has in fact been
doing industrial policy for years. It is government
funding that produced the Internet, radar, lasers, shale
oil drilling methods, and numerous other technologies
that are the underpinnings of today’s economy.
Therefore, there is a role for government in investing
in R&D at a level that increases innovation, productivity,
and growth for all. Furthermore, there is a role for
government in providing training and information so
that all entrepreneurs and innovators have the opportunity to compete on a level playing field.
THE ROLE OF STATES

I

n this discussion about the role of government, there
is a distinction between the role of federal and state
governments. As a general rule, the federal government
cedes to the states programs that deal directly with
individual firms and with regional initiatives, citing
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the states’ abilities to directly respond to local conditions. In turn, the states leave to the federal government the support of basic research and research that
supports national priorities such as defense, health, and
agriculture. In practice, these national needs are met
by partnerships between the federal government and
universities, including many state institutions, so the
lines of responsibility are blurred.
But, since World War II, when Vannevar Bush
(Hart 1998) articulated the importance of continued
federal support of research, and the National Science
Foundation was created, government has funded a large
portion of basic research in this country. Since the early
1980s, however, the states have taken an increasingly
active position in science- and technology-based
economic development, filling in the blanks left by the
federal government’s avoidance of industrial policy and
trying to produce increased economic growth for their
citizens.
Today, the state’s role is described as “enhancing the
innovation ecosystem,” with the goal of increased
productivity, innovation, and competitiveness. The
ecosystem model is relatively recent, having been articulated less than 10 years ago by Iansiti and Levien who
postulated: “There are certainly strong parallels between
business networks and biological ecosystems. Both are
characterized by a large number of loosely interconnected participants that depend on one another for their
effectiveness and survival” (2004: 5). Supporting this
ecosystem has come to mean four things: (1) building
and supporting a state’s research and development
capacity; (2) encouraging a state’s entrepreneurial
community; (3) increasing the productivity of a state’s
economy though the commercialization of new products, services, processes, business models and marketing
strategies; and (4) supporting sectors and/or clusters.
Each of these is part of an overall policy environment
that will support innovation and entrepreneurship,
leading to economic growth.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT CAPACITY

W

hile not all innovation is based on technology,
many new ideas have come from R&D in science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)
disciplines. And it is now better understood that innovation and creativity flourish in open, collaborative
environments such as universities, R&D laboratories,
and research-oriented companies like Apple and Google
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(Johnson 2010). Therefore, states support and build
their R&D capacity. There is a distinction, however,
between public and private research and development
capacity. It takes different methods to encourage the two.
R&D Tax Credit: An Incentive for
Private Research and Development

Since it is clear that companies that do R&D are far
more likely to innovate than others, best practice in
supporting private R&D is the use of the R&D tax
credit. Atkinson (2010) models the impact of increases
in federal and state R&D tax credits and found that the
increased economic activity from a 6 percent increase in
the federal credit would exceed the loss of tax revenues
in 15 years. Atkinson and Andes (2008) suggest that
states should link their tax credits to the federal credit,
allowing firms to take the higher amount. While the
federal government R&D tax credit has been in statute
for more than 30 years, it is still not permanent.
In addition, most of the states have an R&D tax
credit (Miller and Richard 2010). The state tax credit
has been widely studied by economists and has been
found to be effective in increasing R&D spending. For
instance, Wu (2008) found that the existence of a state
R&D tax credit has a positive and significant effect on
the number of high-technology establishments in a state.
However, it also appears that corporations decide where
to conduct their R&D based on the size of the credit, so
the credit affects location decisions (Wilson 2007).
Maine has three R&D tax credits. Taken together,
they are used by a small number of companies, and
according to the Maine Revenue Service, cost Maine
taxpayers $5.5 million in lost revenue in FY13. The
research expenditure tax credit was used by 85 taxpayers;
the super credit by 70; and the high-technology credit
by 60. However, it is not known how many companies
use more than one credit. A study conducted ten years
ago on the Maine R&D tax credit concluded that the
legislature should consider whether Maine’s small firms
are able to use the credits as well as large firms and
whether changes should be made to expand their applicability and therefore their effectiveness (Luger, Feller,
and Renault 2004). Other states allow transferability of
credits, meaning that small companies performing
R&D that is pre-revenue, and therefore without a tax
liability, can sell their credits to others, thereby monetizing the credit. Another concept is having credits that
are refundable, meaning that firm can get cash refunds
if the credits exceed their tax liability.

Building Public Research and
Development Capacity

In addition to funding R&D activities directly in the
states through competitive grant programs, federal agencies, such as the National Science Foundation, National
Institutes of Health, the Department of Energy, and
Department of Defense, fund capacity building in the
states through grants for new laboratories and equipment.
The rationale is actually a national security argument—
that it is important that the country’s R&D capacity be
broad-based and not too geographically centralized. One
program that has been important to Maine is EPSCoR
(Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive
Research), which supports R&D capacity expansion in
the states that receive smaller amounts of competitive
federal funds. Through the EPSCoR program, Maine has
built its Advanced Structures and Composites Laboratory,
the Laboratory for Surface Science and Technology, and
the Forest Bioproducts Research Institute (all at the
University of Maine). EPSCoR requires state support in
the form of a match, as well as a strategic plan for science
and technology and an EPSCoR committee. Maine
statute gives these responsibilities to the Maine Innovation
Economy Advisory Board.

Since the 1980s, many states
have also been investing heavily
in building their R&D capacity.
Since the 1980s, many states have also been
investing heavily in building their R&D capacity.
Popular programs include funding for new laboratories
and equipment and attracting “star” scientists. The
latter, exemplified by the Georgia Research Alliance
Eminent Scholars program, endows chairs for new
professors in fields deemed critical for a state’s economy.
Since its inception in 1990, Georgia has invested in
more than 65 eminent scholars, resulting in over 6,000
new jobs, 300 new companies, and thousands of new
scientific discoveries.
While Maine has not gone in the direction of
attracting this type of talent, the state’s colleges, universities, and nonprofit laboratories all report difficulties
with the recruitment and support of senior faculty due
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to lack of funds. In response, Maine’s 2010 Science and
Technology Plan called for investments to “attract and
keep high-quality researchers and graduate students who
can win competitive federal research grants” (MIEACB
2009: 13). However, the trend to cut investments in
R&D over the past decade has curtailed the development of new programs such as this one.
Maine’s strategy since the mid-1990s has been to
invest in laboratories and equipment. A series of bonds,
initiated by Governors King and Baldacci, approved by
the legislature, and supported by the public, have been
used to build new research facilities at the University of
Maine, the University of New England, and at nonprofit
research organizations in the state. These investments
have been episodic and uneven (Figure 1), however,
despite more than ten years of evidence that they have
paid off for Maine taxpayers. Many commentators, from
the 2006 Brookings report to the annual R&D evaluations, have called for a planned, level, and sustained
investment in this type of funding.1
Since bond funding is only appropriate for building
long-term assets such as laboratories and equipment,
other annual General Fund appropriations are also

needed to support basic research by providing the
matching funds needed by the research institutions to
win competitive and EPSCoR federal funding. Since the
late 1990s, this has come through a line item in the
budget called the Maine Economic Improvement Fund
(MEIF). While this budget item has stayed relatively
stable at around $14,700,000 for the last five years, an
increase in MEIF funding would have direct effects on
an influx of further federal research funding and subsequent spillover effects.
One important caveat is that appropriate technology-transfer policies and procedures at the colleges,
universities, and nonprofit laboratories in the state is
also critical, so that discoveries made in these laboratories can be protected, licensed, and commercialized.
Without this critical link, the state’s investment in
R&D will be considerably less effective. The Maine
Technology Asset Fund, for instance, the program operated by the Maine Technology Institute (MTI) that
dispersed the last two bond investments, has required
recipients to work hard to develop technology-transfer
policies that encourage commercialization of new
discoveries here in Maine.
BUILD
ENTREPRENEURIAL
CAPACITY

Maine’s Investments in Innovation, 1996 to 2013

Figure 1:
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ost countries and states
have programs and
policies designed to support
small businesses and entrepreneurs. These programs
are ubiquitous because all
places have dramatically
more small businesses than
large businesses and because
small businesses create jobs.
The latter assertion
turns out to be somewhat
misleading, and economists
have been trying to sort out
the data for years. Starting
with David Birch’s research
in the 1980s into gazelles
or rapidly growing companies, there has been substantial interest in the type of
firms that create the most
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economic growth. For instance, the Small Business
sold to larger companies. This structure is popular in the
Administration sponsored research in 2007 that found
Internet and biosciences sectors. Large company startups
that increasing small business births by 5 percent would
are usually new divisions designed to facilitate entry into
result in a small increase on Gross State Product (Bruce
a new product or business while social entrepreneurs are
et al. 2007). Acs, Parsons, and Tracy (2008) found that
focused on making the world a better place, rather than
high-impact firms are relatively old, rare, and contribute
creating wealth.
to the majority of economic growth. These authors
Aulet and Murray found that there are different
suggest that the best economic development strategy is
types of entrepreneurs, those who are innovation-driven
to focus scarce resources on cultivating high-growth
vs those small and medium enterprises that serve local
firms, rather than entrepreneurship overall. In contrast,
markets with “traditional, well-understood business
Breitzman and Hicks (2008) found that small firms
ideas and limited competitive advantage” (2013: 4).
were a significant source of innovation and patent
They point out that the small and medium enterprises
activity, developing more patents per employee than
can be important in their local communities and form
larger businesses, with more significant patents as
the majority of employment. But, like Blanks’ small
measured by citations and originality.
business entrepreneurs, their intention is primarily to
More recently, economists have parsed the data
stay small. So, in a world where public investments are
further to discover that the real issue is not the size of the
by necessity limited, small and medium enterprises have
firm, but its age that matters. Stangler and Litan (2009)
less leverage on the economy than do innovation-driven
looked at 2007 Census data to discover that firms that
entrepreneurs. The authors conclude: “If job creation
are between one and five years old account for roughly
and economic prosperity are the goals for a government,
two-thirds of job creation. But, the picture is actually
[innovation-driven] entrepreneurship must be a major
more nuanced than that. Haltwinger, Jarmin, and
element of government strategy and policymaking”
Miranda (2010) have done the most careful statistical
(Aulet and Murray 2013: 9).
study of the issue and conclude that startups are critical
To what extent is this direction appropriate for a
to economic growth, but also that they are the most
rural state such as Maine? Do we have innovation-driven
volatile. That is, startups are responsible for the majority
entrepreneurs? The answer is emphatically “yes.” Experts
of job growth and job destruction. However, if a young
in rural economic development say (Markley and Stark
firm survives, it will tend to grow faster than its more
2009: 1),
mature small counterparts. So, while public policies
Entrepreneurship development can be a Triple Bottom
should support rapidly growing young firms, policyLine development strategy. By helping entrepreneurs…
makers should also understand that many will fail.
to recognize opportunities and build new ventures,
Another piece of this dynamic is that there are many
communities can experience improvements in the
types of entrepreneurs, and not all require the same, or
economy, the environment, and the diversity of resiperhaps any, public interventions. Steve Blank, a Stanford
dents actively participating in civic life.
professor widely known for his work in entrepreneurship, says there are six types of entrepreFigure 2:
Scalable Entrepreneurs
neurs.2 Blank describes lifestyle startups, small
business startups, scalable startups, buyable
startups, large company startups, and social
Scalable
startups. Entrepreneurs start all of these, but
Transition
Company
Startup
they are quite different. Lifestyle entrepreneurs
work to live their passion, while small business
entrepreneurs work to feed their families.
• Business Model found
• Cash-flow breakeven
Scalable startups are born to be big, and like
• Product/Market fit
• Profitable
Google, Skype, Facebook, and Twitter, are built
on visions of changing the world and growing
• Repeatable sales model
• Rapid scale
rapidly (Figure 2). Buyable startups are born to
• Managers hired
• New Senior Management
flip according to Blank, meaning that they are
~ 150 people
built completely with the intention of being
Source: steveblank.com
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Another controversy in the entrepreneurship literature is whether entrepreneurs are born or made, that is,
can you train someone to be an entrepreneur? The
answer seems to be that entrepreneurship is quite opportunistic; people respond to opportunities that they see
and become entrepreneurs without really planning on it
(e.g., Aldrich and Martinez 2001). On the other hand, a
Babson College study found that students who took two
electives on entrepreneurship in college were significantly more likely to start a company upon graduation
(Lange et al. 2011).
MAINE’S SUPPORT FOR ENTREPRENEURS

I

n Maine the commitment to entrepreneurship support,
especially scalable entrepreneurs or innovation-driven
entrepreneurs, has been limited. The Applied Technology
Development Centers program was started in 1999 with
the legislature creating seven incubators focused on
the seven technology sectors, also legislatively defined.
The legislature also defined where each of the incubators would be located, without any data about actual
concentrations of firms in the sectors. For instance, the
biotechnology incubator, now closed, was located in
Fairfield, far from either the Jackson Laboratory or the
resources at the University of Maine in Orono or the
southern Maine bioscience assets at the University of
New England or the IDEXX-based group of bioscience
companies around Portland. The legislature has also cut
the funds to this line item time and time again. In this
fiscal year, the total is down to only $178,838.
However, both the MTI and the Blackstone
Foundation have recognized the importance of investing
in Maine’s scalable entrepreneurs, and their grants have
recently supported the remaining incubator/accelerator
programs in the state: the Maine Center for
Entrepreneurial Development, the Target Technology
Center at Orono, and the Maine Aquaculture Innovation
Center. These three programs have banded together to
provide substantially improved services statewide to
train scalable entrepreneurs through programs such as
Top Gun and Top Gun Prep.
At the same time, a number of private events have
emerged across the country such as Start-up Weekend
and various business plan competitions that continue to
prime the pump by encouraging and challenging entrepreneurs, young and old, to think big.
Across the country, many colleges and universities
now teach entrepreneurship and some K–12 programs
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have been created to introduce entrepreneurial concepts
early on. In Maine, these programs are few and far
between, with the primary example being the Foster
Center for Student Innovation at the University of
Maine and its Innovation Engineering curriculum that
has been rolled out to some of the other campuses of the
University of Maine System.
POLICIES TO SUPPORT PRODUCTIVITY
AND COMPETIVENESS IMPROVEMENTS

T

here are only three ways to increase economic
growth: increase the number of workers, increase
productivity, or growth in high-productivity industries. Productivity means economic output per unit of
input. The unit of input can be an hour of labor or
some combination of labor, equipment, and energy. So,
increasing the number of workers increases the size of
an economy, but doesn’t necessarily increase the average
wage of a worker in that economy. On the other hand,
when all sectors become more productive, prosperity is
more evenly shared. The third way to increase growth
is called the “shift effect.” When an economy loses lowproductivity jobs and gains high-productivity jobs, the
overall economy grows, but there are clearly winners
and losers.
According to Atkinson (2013: 5), “the lion’s share of
productivity growth…comes…from all industries, even
low-productivity ones, boosting their productivity.” But,
he also describes the competitiveness of an economy as
“the ability of a region to export more in value added
terms that it imports” (Atkinson 2013: 2). So, innovation
can increase competitiveness by increasing the ability of
firms to export (outside the region) and increase productivity through the application of better processes,
increased use of equipment, and energy efficiency.
State-level policies designed to support innovation
in firms enable access to new technologies, or support
innovation, adoption, and commercialization. Scarce
state resources, however, should be focused primarily on
firms that are exporting, or plan to export, products
outside the region or the country, the traded sector.
These firms bring new money into the economy, rather
than recirculating monies that are already there.
Increasing Access to New Innovations
One of the most imperfect markets is the market for
information, especially information about new innovations. While thousands of new patents are issued each
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year, it is difficult to access to those patents and other
innovations that are never publicly revealed. Not only
are the numbers overwhelming, but much competitive
advantage is maintained through secrecy, so even with
the Internet, it is difficult to discover what technologies
and innovations might be available to improve the
productivity of a particular firm.
This problem is especially acute when it comes to
technologies created at our nation’s colleges and universities. The transfer of technologies from research institutions into organizations capable of commercializing
them is challenging, overly bureaucratic, and legalistic,
but incredibly necessary. Reforms have been suggested
(Renault et al. 2008; Litan, Mitchell, and Reedy 2007)
and some universities have recently instituted radical
changes. For instance, the University of New Hampshire
has created UNH Innovation, which “comprises
licensing; services such as the InterOperability Lab and
equipment or facilities rentals; and ventures and
economic development” (UNH press release October
29, 2013). There are plans to create a mentorship
program and increased opportunities for students to
work directly with businesses. In a press release
announcing the new organization), Jan Nisbet, senior
vice provost for research at UNH, said, “This creates a
clear path into the university if you’re interested in our
technology, our equipment, and our expertise.
Centralizing our efforts to commercialize the university’s
intellectual assets will allow us to promote and participate in local economic development as well as diversify
revenue streams beyond just licensing income.”
In some states, there has been a concerted attempt
to deal with the problem that technologies created in
universities and other research organizations require a
great of additional work before they are ready to be
licensed and commercialized. This work is often referred
to as translational research, and new centers are
appearing at leading universities to bridge the gaps
between the laboratory bench and the factory floor. A
leading example is the Despande Center at MIT. The
center awards research grants and provides other types
of assistance to MIT faculty whose work shows the
potential to benefit society, transform markets and
industries, and improve the quality of life for people
across the globe.
A related issue is the appropriate protection, through
patenting, trademarks or copyrights, or intellectual
property developed by companies. In Maine, a program
called the Patent Program, located at the University of

Maine School of Law, has been operating since 1999.
The mission of the program is to support economic
development by helping Maine inventors and small
businesses to understand how to identify and protect
their intellectual property. The program, however, suffers
from the issues discussed earlier, in that it does not
discriminate between companies with the ability to scale
their innovations and people for whom invention is a
hobby. In addition, funding for this program has also
been declining for over a decade, and it does not have
the resources to meet the demand for its services. In
March 2014, the law school announced that the
program is being cut, due to budget constraints,

There are two big hurdles to the
adoption and commercialization
of new innovations by companies,
startups, or existing firms: capital
and know-how.

TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION AND
COMMERCIALIZATION: ACCESS TO CAPITAL

T

here are two big hurdles to the adoption and
commercialization of new innovations by companies, startups, or existing firms: capital and know-how.
Most states now offer a variety of programs to deal with
access to capital; a few, such as Maine, also encourage
and teach the process of commercialization.
Access to capital for technology adoption is
primarily access to equity capital. Sources of debt, like
banks, are typically uneasy with the process of adoption
of new technology because there is by definition no
track record to go on. Therefore, the high-risk profile of
technology adoption and commercialization is more
suited to the high-return profile of equity capital. The
type of capital required depends entirely on where the
innovation is in its product life cycle. Figure 3 shows a
typical product life cycle and the types of capital that are
appropriate at various stages of development.
Early, prerevenue, funding, often referred to as the
“valley of death,” is not easily obtained in private markets.
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Therefore, many states have instituted public programs
that support projects at this stage of development, essentially betting that some of the projects will be successful
and yield increased follow-on investment and successful,
growing companies. In Maine, the programs are administered by the MTI, and funded annually through a
General Fund appropriation. Since its inception in 1999,
MTI has invested over $105 million in 1,300 technology projects and has documented a return to Maine
taxpayers of 14:1.
Following prerevenue grant programs, many states
also support matching funds for federal programs aimed
at translational research and commercialization, notably
Small Business Innovation Research funds. Again,
Maine’s version of this program is housed at MTI, and
has been demonstrated to be successful in increasing the
win-rate of Maine companies who apply to this extremely
competitive program. Matching funds for Small Business
Innovation Research awards increases the amount of
federal funds flowing to small, innovative firms in the
state and increases their likelihood of finding follow-on
capital and ultimately commercializing their products.3
Often angels, private investors with a high net
worth who invest in early-stage firms, are active in states

supporting innovative companies. In Maine, a group
called Maine Angels, made up of individual investors,
meets regularly to review investment opportunities.
Generally, angel groups are private, although in many
ecosystems like Maine’s, the angels are an integral part of
the fabric that supports entrepreneurs with innovative
ideas. Some states organize angel groups, but their
operation is generally privately led.
Many states, however, see a public purpose in
encouraging angel investment. Therefore, they have tax
credits aimed at lowering the risk associated with these
early-stage investments. Like the R&D tax credits previously discussed, so-called seed-stage tax credits have
been shown to be effective in increasing angel investments, leading to greater sustainability and growth of
innovation-based companies.
Maine’s Seed Capital Tax Credit is one of the oldest
in the country, dating back to 1990. Since 2002, the
credit has been helped create 1,800 jobs and maintain
another 5,000. It has recently been extensively reviewed
by the legislature and extended past its original $30
million statutory cap. Unfortunately, the bill to extend
the credit ran into the budgetary realities in the 2012–13
legislative session, and as a result, there was no credit in
2013, and the amounts available will be
limited in the years thereafter.
This is in stark contrast to other
Figure 3: Types of Capital Appropriate for Stages of a Company’s
states
that have more broadly supported
Development
similar programs. For instance, in New
Revenues
Jersey in 2013 Gov. Chris Christie (R)
signed into law a $25 million angel
investor tax credit program to encourage
early investment in emerging busiStage
Pre-Seed
Seed
Early
Scale-up
nesses. The program provides tax credits
for up to 10 percent of a qualified
investment
in businesses with fewer
Venture Funds, Banks
Source
Family and
Angels/Angel Groups/
than
225
employees
that conduct
Friends
SBIR/MTI
research, manufacturing, or technology
commercialization.
Amount
Following angel funding, the next
$25,000
$250,000
$2,500,000
step closer to commercialization for
innovation-driven and/or scalable
companies is venture funding. For that
$0
reason,
most states have some form of a
Valley of Death
Time
state venture capital fund that invests in
relatively high-risk, high-reward firms.
In the past year, the U.S. Department of
Treasury has added significant funding
Source: steveblank.com
to these state venture funds through a
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$1.5 billion program called the State Small Business
Credit Initiative. Venture capital is a highly effective
method for accelerating scalable enterprises and is credited with producing 21 percent of the nation’s current
economy, 11.9 million jobs (IHS Global Insight 2011).
Maine’s fund, Maine Venture Fund (formerly
known as the Small Enterprise Growth Fund) was
formed in the mid-1990s with a state investment in the
form of a bond. It received additional funding in 2010.
The fund, a nonprofit, is operated as an evergreen fund,
which means that profits from investments are put back
into the fund to invest in other companies. Since its
inception, the Maine Venture Fund has invested $13.4
million in 45 Maine companies.
A final type of access to capital is less glamorous,
but nevertheless critical to supporting the adoption of
new technology, especially by more mature firms. This
comes in the form of tax credits for the purchase of new
equipment and training of workers. Many states allow
companies to deduct these expenses and/or give explicit
tax credits against property taxes. The latter is used in
Maine, as part of the BETR/BETE system of business
equipment tax relief. However, the program is regularly
raided by the legislature to balance the budget, and often
companies will only be able to claim a percentage of the
credit: in 2013, the amount was only 60 percent. The
credit for business equipment purchases is extremely
controversial in Maine, largely because many large
national companies take advantage of it and are widely
believed not to require such assistance from Maine
taxpayers. A solution more closely aligned with innovation policies would be to have business equipment tax
credits associated with companies that have patents or
exports, or no property taxes on companies that invest
more than 15 percent of their revenues in research and
development.
Innovation Engineering
Last, the know-how associated with the process of
technology commercialization is another information
asymmetry—some firms know how to do it and others
do not. Therefore, providing technical assistance to firms
to increase the likelihood of commercialization is consistent with supporting an innovation-based economic
growth strategy. For most companies, innovation is a
luxury, something to be attended to when all other
activities are complete. But, to benefit from the strategy
of never-ending innovation, companies need to have a
system for innovation. In Maine, many companies are

implementing Innovation Engineering, a system for
innovation developed by University of Maine alumnus
Doug Hall. The University of Maine’s Foster Center, the
Maine Manufacturing Extension Partnership, Maine
Center for Entrepreneurial Development, and MTI are
all supporting the rollout of Innovation Engineering as
a replicable system for increasing the speed of innovation, while reducing the risk.4
SUPPORTING CLUSTERS

F

or 15 years, clusters have been the buzzword in
economic development. Popularized by Harvard
professor Michael Porter, cluster theory suggests that
regions have strengths not just in a single sector, but
also in the intersection of a number of sectors that
share workforce, educational, and research assets, as
well as support services. Examples frequently cited are
the wine making cluster in California’s Napa Valley
or the biotechnology cluster in Research Triangle
Park, North Carolina. In the latter, there are medical
schools and research laboratories, pharmaceutical
companies, biotechnology startups, as well as manufacturing companies that specialize in packaging for drugs,
testing firms that do FDA-compliant protocols for
drugs under development, venture capitalists, attorneys,
and advertising agencies, all with particular expertise in
biotechnology.
From a political point of view, supporting the development of a cluster is more palatable than working with
a single company, as it avoids the appearance of picking
winners and losers and spreads the risk substantially.
From a policy point of view, cluster programs have
suffered a bad reputation nationally because practically
every state has declared that it has a biotechnology
cluster, thus making the distinction meaningless.
In Maine, the MTI has invested from time to time
in cluster-development activities. This program is
currently under review amid concerns that MTI has
spread its funds too thin and invested in some sectors
that are too small to become sustainable.
FINAL THOUGHTS

O

utside Maine, the state is considered to be a leader
in innovation-based economic development, and
the MTI in particular has been recognized for some of
its programs. This leadership comes from Maine’s broad
array of programs, even though the total funding from
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the state is modest compared to that of other states,
whether in actual dollars or on a per capita basis.
This leadership position is also due to the longstanding evaluation of Maine’s R&D investment, started
in 1999, and until recently, performed annually.
Evaluations such as the one done in Maine inform the
legislature about the effectiveness of state investments in
meeting strategic economic development goals and the
efficiency of the programs in leveraging state monies to
gain new private investment. Ongoing evaluation is
critical not only to transparency and accountability of
state investment, but is also essential to improving the
delivery of the programs themselves.
Innovation is a primary role of state government. It
is a major driver of economic growth and the ability of
the state to increase the well-being of its citizens through
the provision of well-paying, nonexportable jobs.
Innovation, like economic development and education,
is so essential that many states are now housing their
innovation policy advisors in the governor’s office, rather
than in an agency or department. In Maine, the Office
of Innovation is in the Department of Economic and
Community Development and is currently staffed by a
long-time traditional economic developer, rather than
by an expert in technology-based economic development. In the future, innovation policy needs to be
elevated to a level that is consistent with its importance
to the state’s future. ENDNOTES
1. For further discussion of Maine’s R&D funding, see
this issue’s article by Evan Richert. 2014. “R&D:
Cornerstone of the Knowledge Economy.”
Maine Policy Review 23(1): 48–56
2. http://steveblank.com/2011/09/01/why-governments
-don’t-get-startups.
3. Details on the Small Business Innovation Research
Program are available in the recorded testimony
of Charles W. Wessner to the Small Business and
Entrepreneurship Committee of the U.S. Senate.
Available at: http://www7.Nationalacademies.org
/ocga/testimony/SBIR_Program.asp.
4. For more information on Innovation Engineering, see
the interview with Doug Hall, this issue: Lukens, Margo.
2014. “Interview with Doug Hall on the Role of Training
in Innovation.” Maine Policy Review 23(1): 75–79
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